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Juridical Framings of Immigrants in the United 
States and France: Courts, Social Movements, and 
Symbolic Politics 
 
Leila Kawar, Bowling Green State University 
 
This paper reexamines the engagement of U.S. and French courts with immigration politics, aiming to 
provide a fuller accounting of how law and immigration politics shape one another. Jurisprudential principles 
are placed in national and historical context, elucidating the role of rights-oriented legal networks in 
formulating these arguments during the 1970s and early 1980s. The analysis traces how these judicial 
constructions of immigrants subsequently contributed to catalyzing a transformation of immigration politics 
in both countries. Immigrant rights jurisprudence is shown to be produced by, as well as productive of, 
broader political values, agendas, and identities. 
 
For scholars of immigration politics, the fact that sovereign democratic states do not 
enact, let alone implement, policies of complete border closure has seemed to fly in the 
face of public opinion surveys favoring more restrictive policies.  Explanations for this 
puzzle frequently identify the courts as culprits for this overturning of politically popular 
policies.i  Although scholars vary in how they use the term “judicialization” to apply to 
immigration policy (Soennecken, 2008), there is nevertheless a general acknowledgement 
that courts over the past several decades have made important contributions to the politics 
of immigration, although the normative sources of this judicial contribution remain the 
subject of discussion.   
Debate has centered on whether domestic or international political dynamics were 
more important in propelling the judicial expansions of non-citizen rights.  Globalization 
and international human rights theorists assert international politics to be of primary 
importance (Hollifield, 1992; Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996; Dauvergne, 2008), while 
comparativists situate the emergence of counter-majoritarian immigration jurisprudence 
within the domestic political dynamics of each state (Guiraudon, 2000; Joppke, 2001; 
Togman, 2001). A somewhat overlapping debate has concerned whether judiciaries are 
characterized by an institutionally-specific liberal logic, the position taken by Guiraudon, 
or whether the judiciary is best understood as embedded within a broader normative 
regime of liberalism or neo-liberalism (Hollifield, 2004; Sassen, 2006; Boswell, 2007).  
Yet, despite their differences, both international convergence scholars and comparative 
institutionalists cast the “liberal” activism of the courts in opposition to an a priori ideal 
of “nationhood” whose accomplishment the courts are seen to obstruct.  Law and society 
in these accounts are thus both portrayed as discrete and analytically separate. 
A constitutive conception of law (Hunt, 1985; Harrington and Yngvesson, 1990; 
Brigham, 1996) allows us to better appreciate the full scope of judicial engagement with 
immigration policy, particularly the reciprocal relations between immigrant rights and the 
politics of immigration. Drawing on post-structuralist theories of the role of language in 
constituting social relations, this approach conceptualizes observable legal practices – 
norms, principles, and conventions – as embodying ideology.  However, rather than being 
epiphenomenal to global economic structures or reducible to a timeless institutional 
feature of the judiciary, legal regimes are understood as produced, reproduced, and 
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transformed by jurists operating within specific historical contexts. Moreover, insofar as 
they come to be institutionalized and internalized, legal forms play a constitutive role in 
politics, defining political identities and crystallizing political agendas.  In other words, 
law - within this framework - holds the potential not simply to block policies from being 
enacted but to discursively restructure political debate.  
Drawing on this interpretive approach, my analysis reexamines the engagement of 
American and French courts with immigration politics, aiming to provide a fuller 
accounting of how law and immigration politics shape one another. Part I presents two 
case studies to illustrate the nationally-distinct formulations of rights-bearing immigrants 
developed by American and French judges.  Part II traces how this immigrant rights 
jurisprudence was built upon arguments developed by legal networks with close ties to 
liberal/left political currents.  Part III shows how judicial constructions of immigrants as 
rights-bearing legal subjects have contributed to catalyzing a transformation of 
immigration politics in both of these countries. Immigrant rights jurisprudence is shown 
to be produced by, as well as productive of, broader political values, agendas, and 
identities.  The analysis thus elucidates the reciprocal relations between law and society 
that characterize the contemporary politics of immigration. 
 
THEORIZING THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF IMMIGRATION 
POLITICS 
Empirical investigations into judicial engagement with immigration issues have grappled 
with two separate but related questions.  The first question concerns how best to 
characterize and explain the normative motivations for judicial enunciations of rights.  
The second concerns the extent to which these rights-oriented judicial decisions are seen 
to have an impact on the wider politics of immigration. In what follows, I briefly outline 
the scope of recent contributions to scholarship in this area. 
The emergence of a contemporary immigrant rights jurisprudence is viewed by 
constructivist international relations scholars as a manifestation of an international regime 
of “embedded liberalism” (Hollifield, 1992; Gomes, 2000; Hollifield, 2004), formal 
conventions and informal codes that commit states to upholding liberal values.  Liberal 
hegemonic states find it difficult to derogate from this international order, in part because 
this would call into question their ability to export their system internationally. States are 
thus torn between their restrictive proclivities and their normative commitments to liberal 
values, which include not only free trade but also respect for individual rights.  When 
courts issue decisions that protect the rights of non-citizens, they are simply acting out 
their part in this post-war system of embedded liberalism. 
Critical sociologists and legal scholars have offered an alternate account of the 
link between judicialization and globalization in the context of immigration.  For Saskia 
Sassen, globalization has loosened the “national grip” on citizens’ rights, and in this new 
global economic structure foreign economic actors are constructed as rights-bearing 
persons and human rights get incorporated into national law (Sassen, 1996). Similarly, 
David Jacobson asserts, primarily on the basis of jurisprudence developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights, that continued high levels of international migration 
necessitate an accommodating jurisprudential response, which he argues will be 
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grounded in international human rights principles rather than in domestic constitutional 
norms (Jacobson, 1996).  With relatively greater circumspection, Catherine Dauvergne 
locates judicial recognition of “a space for marginal migrants within the law” as an 
emergent phenomenon embedded within rule of law norms (as opposed to human rights 
norms) that are unhinged from the nation and produced by globalization’s “legalization of 
everything everywhere” (Dauvergne, 2008: 182-183). 
These internationalist accounts, although they represent very different disciplinary 
perspectives, are nevertheless similar in so far as they emphasize structurally-embedded 
global regimes while discounting the importance of national specificities and distinctions.  
According to these analyses, judicial decisions articulating rights for immigrants are 
reflections of economic, political, and ideological structures operating across national 
borders.  Indeed, in Sassen and Hollifield’s accounts immigrant rights jurisprudence is 
almost epiphenomenal to global structures and conditions and its independent 
contribution to the politics of immigration is minimal. 
By contrast, legal scholar Peter Schuck explains the transformation of 
immigration law as shaped not only by structural changes operating at the international 
level but also by ideological developments within American law. Schuck describes the 
U.S. immigration system as operating in a state of crisis, with unprecedented levels of 
clandestine migration highlighting the contradictions inherent in traditional immigration 
law principles of absolute sovereign control.  In a move that draws intellectual inspiration 
from the pragmatist tradition of sociological jurisprudence, Schuck suggests that because 
traditional immigration legal principles are out of sync with contemporary conditions, 
judges are altering their jurisprudence so as to restore legal coherence and legitimacy.  In 
doing so, they draw upon the universal human rights aspects of liberal constitutionalism, 
ideas already manifested in other areas of private and public law (Schuck, 1984: 50).  
Subsequent legal scholarship has tempered Schuck’s early claims, suggesting that 
immigrant rights have been established in some areas of law but that U.S. courts remain 
unwilling to question federal authority when border control is implicated (Legomsky, 
1987; Motomura, 2008).  Commenting on developments within their own legal system, 
French legal scholars admit that important judicial decisions have expanded rights for 
immigrants but these scholars have generally viewed the glass more as half empty than 
half full (Lochak, 1985; Crepeau, 1990).  Not surprisingly, when discussing the impact of 
court decisions, legal scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic has focused almost 
exclusively on the legal sphere,ii viewing the dynamics of judicial and legislative decision 
making as separate and distinct. A common assumption is that courts can “only 
marginally” affect broad policy choices, such as the appropriate utilization of border 
control resources, and that legislatures will independently address these difficult policy 
tradeoffs (Schuck, 1984: 85). 
It is this distinction between courts and legislatures that comparativist political 
scientists have emphasized.  Taking issue with internationalist explanations, these 
scholars have been keen to demonstrate that it was domestic institutional changes, as 
opposed to changes in the international system, that brought immigration under judicial 
oversight (Joppke, 1998; Guiraudon, 2000; Togman, 2001; Schain, 2008). They explain 
the judiciary’s intervention in immigration policy matters as a result of both the 
“maturity” of rule of law principles (Joppke, 1998; Guiraudon, 2000) and changing 
political party dynamics (Schain, 2008). Driven by a mandate to ensure equal treatment 
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under the law, autonomous legal institutions have turned to the universalistic principles 
of constitutional texts and applied them to a range of policymaking domains, including 
immigration.  In these accounts, it was not so much a new ideology that motivated 
immigrant rights as a shift in domestic institutional configurations that opened the way 
for courts to assert themselves. 
Although some comparativist political scientists view judicial decisions as having 
minimal impact on immigration politics (Schain, 2008: 67), other comparativist scholars 
see immigrant rights court decisions as altering the overall dynamics of immigration 
policy making. Togman points out that court decisions curtailing administrative 
discretion have had the indirect effect of heightening the public and politicized nature of 
immigration policy making (Togman, 2001: 113).  Similarly, Guiraudon contends that the 
threat of judicial sanction has ushered in a new policymaking dynamic whereby 
politicians, who had previously been able to formulate immigration policy without 
judicial interference, now test the limits of judicial willingness to uphold immigrant 
rights in a “game of cat-and-mouse” (Guiraudon, 2000: 205).  And Joppke suggests that, 
particularly if they are made by courts with a strong tradition of autonomy,iii immigrant 
rights decisions may push political elites to reformulate their overall approach to 
immigrant communities (Joppke, 1998: 83-84). In these accounts, the potential power of 
the legal institutions lies in their institutional autonomy from politics. 
We are thus left with a marked contrast between internationalist and comparative-
institutionalist perspectives on how law and courts matter for immigration politics. 
Comparativist analyses describe an autonomous judiciary, operating independently of 
other political actors, whose unique institutional qualities allow it to exercise a 
liberalizing influence on immigration politics. By contrast, internationalist analyses 
characterize national laws as epiphenomenal to extra-national economic and political 
structures. Immigrant rights jurisprudence in these models simply manifests and 
reinforces a broader international regime.  
An interpretive socio-legal analysis of immigration politics calls our attention to 
the discursive and symbolic dimensions of jurisprudential activity, which both 
comparativist and internationalist studies have tended to overlook.  Rather than depicting 
legal norms and institutions either as operating autonomously from political dynamics or 
as merely replicating global economic forces and political calculations, an interpretive 
socio-legal approach conceptualizes law as produced, reproduced, and transformed by 
social struggles. Social movement conflict is understood to propel new legal claims, 
which may be transmuted into new forms of law through responsive judicial 
interpretation (Siegel, 2006). And actors located outside of official legal institutions can 
be seen to have in important role in shaping the meaning of the law by revising or 
reinventing forms of legal relationship (Harrington, 1994). Moreover, by formulating and 
legitimizing a particular vision of society, judicial enunciations of rights also have the 
potential to act as catalysts for wide-ranging political realignments (Brigham, 2009). 
Victories in court can be effective for movement building, both by providing norms 
around which a movement can define itself and organize its struggle, and by supplying a 
weapon that can push otherwise uncooperative foes into making concessions or 
compromises (McCann, 1994).  
In short, we must look beyond case outcomes to explore the multiple ways in 
which legal ideas and legal language constitute and are constituted by broader social 
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forces. By translating their claims into law, interest groups and social movements seek to 
mobilize legal symbols of both substantive right and institutional authority.  The potential 
power of judicial decisions enunciating rights for immigrants therefore extends well 
beyond their ability to constrain politicians with otherwise fixed preferences. Indeed, 
even in the absence of a definitive court victory enunciating new constitutional rights, 
legal mobilizations that successfully activate public moral sensibilities hold the potential 
to shape the type of immigration politics that are possible. 
Guided by this framework emphasizing the co-constitutive relationship between 
law and immigration politics, we see that the extent to which judicial decisions replicate 
or transform political dynamics will be historically and contextually contingent and can 
only be assessed through careful empirical examination of specific case studies. The 
analysis in this paper therefore reexamines the place of legal ideas and institutions in two 
countries that have featured prominently in previous studies of the immigration politics, 
the U.S. and France.  Both are important migrant destination countries.  And, as 
discussed below, in both countries immigration politics and immigration jurisprudence 
have been shaped by rights-oriented mobilizations for greater administrative legality.   
The analysis starts by providing a close reading of immigrant rights judicial 
decisions to which particular significance has been attributed, both by scholars and by 
those involved in the cases.  By calling attention to national differences in immigrant 
rights jurisprudence, the comparison highlights something overlooked in studies 
generalizing across countries, namely legal professionals in different countries have 
constructed immigrant rights in substantially different ways.  And by historicizing the 
development of immigrant rights jurisprudence, linking it to the evolving history of 
public interest reform movements in the U.S. and France, the comparison points to the 
shortcomings of models of inter-institutional dynamics that collapse this ongoing and 
reciprocal process of knowledge production.   
PART I: COMPARING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 
 
This section offers a close reading of American and French immigrant rights juridical 
decisions in order to explore the ways in which the judges who authored these decisions 
framed their enunciations of rights.  It focuses on the two most widely-discussed 
instances of the contemporary development of immigrant rights jurisprudence: the 1982 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Plyler v Doe and the 1978 GISTI decision of France’s 
Conseil d’Etat.  Scholars offering divergent theoretical perspectives on the politics of 
immigration have used these cases to illustrate their accounts of judicialization 
(Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 1998; Gomes, 2000; Guiraudon, 2000; Sassen, 2006).  In 
addition, the two cases feature among the list of litigation campaigns to which experts in 
each country’s “immigrant rights community” attach particular significance or 
importance.iv  
A discursive analysis of the Plyler and GISTI decisions suggests that immigrants 
in the U.S. and France find themselves in quite different places within the law. As 
discussed below, in both of these cases, rule of law principles take substantive forms that 
are striking in their contrast, indicating the importance of national variation in the 
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development of immigrant rights, a dimension of the phenomenon of judicialization that 
is often occluded in internationalist narratives.  National differences in the conjuring of 
rights-bearing immigrants also call into question the institutionalist emphases of 
comparative scholars, which emphasize a timeless institutionally-contained logic of 
legality that is insufficient for explaining jurisprudential variation.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the fact that the judges in these cases address themselves to contemporary 
immigration debates, going beyond the statutes at issue in each case, indicates the extent 
to which these courts eschewed purely textualist approaches to legal interpretation and 
instead considered broad principles when interpreting the law.   
Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 Plyler decision struck down a Texas statute denying 
state funding for the public education of undocumented migrant children. In 1975, 
Texas’s State Legislature amended Section 2301 of its educational code so as to cease 
reimbursing local school districts for the costs of educating undocumented children in 
free public schools. The provision was challenged by immigrant supporters as a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and both 
the majority and dissenting justices grounded their arguments in an interpretation of this 
clause known as “Footnote Four Jurisprudence.”v  This doctrine, developed during the 
New Deal era, directs courts to strictly scrutinize legislation that 1) appears on its face 
violate Constitutional provisions protecting individual rights or 2) is directed against 
discrete and insular minorities who lack sufficient numbers or power to seek redress 
through the political process. 
It is illuminating to read how Justice Brennan’s majority opinion applies this legal 
test to the facts of the case.  His decision begins by drawing upon the findings made in 
the initial Plyler trial by District Court Judge William Wayne Justice that without an 
education, undocumented children, “[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack 
of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices,…will become permanently 
locked into the lowest socio-economic class” (1982: 208). Migrants might regularize their 
immigration status, for example by marrying a legal resident, but they would remain 
members of Texas’s disadvantaged Mexican minority (ibid).  This contextualized reading 
interprets a Texas statute that ostensibly targets only undocumented aliens in light of 
Texas’s longstanding Anglo-Latino caste system in which the educational needs of both 
legally-resident Mexican-Americans and unauthorized Mexican migrants are not being 
met.  
Unlike the dissenting opinions, which frame the Texas law as a rational legislative 
response to the perceived costs of immigration, the majority emphasizes the law’s 
discriminatory effects, holding that “depriving the children of any disfavored group of an 
education, [would] foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of 
esteem in which it is held by the majority” (1982: 222). After alluding to the pivotal 
importance of education in sustaining “our political and cultural heritage” and “our 
democratic society,” Brennan then quotes at length from the 1954 decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education supporting the Warren Court doctrine that “it [is] most difficult to 
reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the 
framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause” (ibid).  Aliens, even 
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those whose presence in the country is unlawful, are people "in any ordinary sense of the 
term," and their non-citizen children have protection under the 14th Amendment from 
discriminatory education policies unless the government can show a substantial state 
interest in discriminating in this manner.vi  
 Moreover, the decision in Plyler is not confined to technical legal analysis. 
Brennan directly addresses the federal government’s immigration policies, asserting that 
the combination of lax federal enforcement and Texas’s statutory discrimination created a 
lethal combination that threatened to create a “permanent caste of undocumented resident 
aliens…an underclass that presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself 
on principles of equality under law” (1982: 219). Thus, although the decision overturned 
a state statutory provision, the majority opinion was clearly directed towards federal 
policy discussions, citing approvingly a Presidential proposal to legalize a large 
proportion of undocumented immigrants, “who have become, in effect, members of the 
community” (1982: 219). Criticized by the dissenting justices for being based on policy 
outcome rather than on general principles, the opinion endorses a general amnesty for 
undocumented immigrants who are implicitly framed as a racially-excluded underclass. 
The Plyler decision thus conceptualizes immigrants as the most vulnerable members of a 
racialized minority, who should be allowed to take part in the American mosaic and who 
should be given the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with the children of 
other groups.  
GISTI, Conseil d’Etat, Assemblée, 8 December 1978, RL.1978.458 
 
The 1978 GISTI decision of France’s Conseil d’Etat has likewise been offered up by 
immigration scholars and practitioners alike as an exemplar of immigrant rights 
jurisprudence.  At issue in this case was a November 1977 administrative decree 
guaranteeing the right of immigrants with at least three years residence in France to bring 
their immediate family members to join them, but making family migration conditional 
upon the agreement of those seeking residence permits not to take up any employment.  
The decree was held to violate a provision in the Preamble to France’s 1946 Constitution 
declaring that, “the nation will assure to each individual and to families the conditions 
necessary for their development.”  The justiciability of constitutional rights, including the 
right to family life, had first been enunciated by France’s Constitutional Council in a 
decision seven years earlier, when the content of the Preamble of the Fifth Republic’s 
1958 Constitution was held to constitute a “bloc constitutionnel” that judges would 
henceforth apply (Liberté d’Association, Conseil Constitutionnel, 16 July 1971). Adding 
to the GISTI decision’s significance is the fact that it was the first to put into practice this 
newly justiciable constitutional right to family life.   
The Conseil d’Etat’s official decision in the case is characteristically terse.  
However, in the published report of the Conseil d’Etat’s designated legal advisor for the 
case, the “Commissaire du Gouvernement,” which clarified the Conseil d’Etat’s opinion 
and was widely read by commentators, it is possible to trace the reasoning by which the 
right to family life is applied to foreigners. The report of Commissaire Dondoux went out 
of its way to enunciate a substantive principle in the case, drawing upon Republican 
values to declare: “Our tradition is one of rights of man and not just of citizen and it 
proclaims principles that surpass our frontiers” (Dondoux, 1979: 17). It declared that 
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France’s administrative policy of allowing immigrant workers to bring their families to 
join them, a policy that the 1977 decree ostensibly maintained, was not simply a matter of 
administrative discretion but rather a policy mandated by the Constitutional right to 
family life.  
According to Dondoux, family regroupment – and the right to family life upon 
which it is grounded – implies “at the least a right to residence for all migrant families, 
whether or not they plan to enter the labor force” (Dondoux, 1979: 24).  In other words, 
according to this Constitutional interpretation, if migrant families are not allowed to enter 
the labor force fulfill their material needs, their ability to enjoy their formal right to 
family life is compromised. The administration’s formalistic argument that the 1977 
decree preventing family members from working did not altogether prohibit family 
regroupment was judged to be “too general and too absolute” (Dondoux, 1979: 24) to 
pass constitutional muster.  According to the Conseil d’Etat’s jurisprudence, the 
government may have good reasons for denying one or another individual migrant a work 
permit, but these national interests must be weighed against the rights of migrant 
families, meaning immigration administration is bound by standards of substantive and 
procedural legality, including the requirement of individual examination. 
Moreover, in overturning the decree, French judges appear to have been seeking 
to intervene in a broader debate over immigration politics. The conclusions of the 
commissaire’s report state that, “One of the main interests of this case is to allow the 
addressing of the question – subject to much controversy – of the rights of foreigners to 
residence and work” (Dondoux, 1979: 25).   Commissaire Dondoux goes on to state that, 
although it is not required by the case, it is important to articulate the following principle:  
 
Once authorized to reside and work, foreigners have a minimum of rights…to stability in their 
situation and to a progressive consolidation of these situations…. Moreover, foreigners have a 
right – unless legislation exists to the contrary – to not be expelled from our territory except 
for reasons of public order, and public order must be interpreted restrictively (Dondoux, 1979: 
26). 
 
By stating that immigrants, as workers, had accumulated rights that the State could not 
take away, the Conseil d’Etat transformed the State’s instrumental guest worker program 
into a source of rights for immigrant workers.  Rather than existing as a resource for 
France’s economic development, the individual immigrant shared, at least partially, in the 
rights of French citizens. The GISTI jurisprudence creates the immigrant worker as a 
figure who has been incorporated into the nation as an authorized resident and as a 
worker, and whose rights cannot be violated without diminishing the Republic’s overall 
commitment to legality. 
PART II: A LEGAL MOBILIZATION HISTORY OF 
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
FRANCE 
How can we explain the substantively distinct and politically-engaged articulations of 
rights that are visible in the Plyler and GISTI decisions? By way of explanation, this 
section situates immigrant right jurisprudence nationally and historically, tracing its 
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origins to the politics of American and French liberal/leftist movements active during the 
1970s.  The Plyler and GISTI decisions, as well as other less well-known immigrant 
rights decisions of this period, are grounded in legal arguments generated by rights-
oriented attorneys who developed innovative formulations of immigrants and their place 
in the law.  
The protagonists in this narrative are part of a generation of legally trained young 
professionals in the U.S. and France who started their careers at a time when rights-
oriented politics was ascendant. In both countries, reform-oriented legal networks aimed 
to expand individual liberties and rule of law within the welfare state, working in tandem 
with liberal/left political currents shaped by the anti-authoritarian spirit of the post-1968 
period (Ross, 2002).  Social issues, including immigration, which had previously been 
conceptualized primarily in materialist terms were reframed at this time as questions 
implicating individual liberties (Sunstein, 2004). 
The comparative lens points to the ways in which American and French versions 
of this 1970s politics of rights were oriented in strikingly different directions. The 
policies and principles developed by rights-oriented reform movements drew selectively 
from national political traditions and reformulated them in new ways. Taking each 
country in turn, I show how the contemporaneous rights-based frames colored the way in 
which immigrants and immigration questions came to be formulated first by legal 
networks outside the courts and then in authoritative judicial enunciations.  
 
U.S. Juridical Framing: Immigrants and Civil Rights Pluralism  
The U.S. politics of rights that developed in the 1960s and reached full blossom in the 
1970s has been the subject of numerous scholarly and popular commentaries.   A number 
of recent studies have attempted to place this movement in historical context (Kalman, 
1996; Dudziak, 2000; Skrentny, 2002; Hilbink, 2006; Teles, 2008).  These historical 
analyses paint a picture of a powerful “liberal legal network” that had become firmly 
institutionalized by the early 1970s, having emerged from diverse intellectual and 
organizational sources during the preceding decades. 
 A significant factor in the development of the U.S. politics of rights of the 1960s 
and 1970s was the assertive rights-oriented jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Following its landmark 1954 decision in Brown v Board of Education ending de jure 
segregation in public schools, the Warren Court issued decisions expanding the 
constitutional rights of a range of other disadvantaged groups, including criminal 
defendants, recipients of government social services, and minority voters.  In doing so, 
the Supreme Court discarded the posture of legislative deference endorsed by judges 
during the New Deal era and instead adopted the mantle of preeminent guardian of 
constitutional rights. 
 The liberal legal network that emerged in the 1960s aimed to implement and 
further develop the principle of equal protection of the laws enunciated so famously in 
Brown.  Urban elites actively supported the social movement to advance black civil 
rights.  Alabama Governor George Wallace’s defiance in the face of a federal district 
court’s desegregation order, was an important moment in motivating President Kennedy 
to embrace civil rights as a central policy commitment of the federal government (2000: 
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178). During the summer of 1964, task forces of Ivy League experts and scholars 
undertook the work of outlining an ambitious civil rights agenda of congressional action, 
executive branch enforcement efforts, and court orders that would eventually be put into 
effect by the Johnson administration (Skrentny, 2002). Based on these recommendations, 
federal programs were designed to remove racial and ethnic discrimination in a wide 
range of areas, including immigration law, election law, and employment law. 
The liberal elites who designed the Great Society’s civil rights programs 
embraced the principle of equal rights within the framework of liberal pluralism.   
Pluralist political ideology developed in the 1950s as a Cold War defense of American 
democracy from the charge that political power under the capitalist system had come to 
be held by a narrow class of elites.vii Deemphasizing class divisions, pluralism 
recognized, and even celebrated, the existence of multiple sub-national identities – 
including ethnic, cultural, and racial identities.viii When U.S. liberals called for greater 
legality in government, they implicitly embraced a pluralist framework. The welfare 
state’s shortcomings were seen not as structural bias but rather as problems that could be 
corrected by giving representatives of minority groups a voice in the decision-making 
process.   
In the early 1970s, the Ford Foundation’s grant programs exemplified and 
actively promoted this vision of civil rights multiculturalism.  Beginning in 1966 under 
the direction of McGeorge Bundy, formerly one of President Kennedy’s “wise men,” the 
Foundation embarked on a strategy to build up the resources of minority group 
organizations in order to ensure that ethnic and racial discrimination would receive 
sustained political attention.ix  Bundy was guided by the belief that “to get past our 
terrible inheritance of racism” it was of vital importance to continue to affirmatively 
promote the access of ethnic minorities to voting, education, employment, housing, and 
the administrative and civil court systems (McClymont and Golub, 2000). By giving 
minority groups the resources to engage in shaping public policy, the Foundation aimed 
to create a new equilibrium in which minority constituencies would be made competitive 
within the pluralist political process. 
This liberal politics of rights is manifested in Supreme Court decisions that 
expanded “Footnote Four” equal protection scrutiny to include groups who could draw 
convincing parallels between their own experience of disadvantage and the signature 
historical experience of U.S. blacks with discrimination (Craig v. Boren, 1976).  The 
Court’s jurisprudence also expanded beyond legal neutrality towards a concept of 
affirmative action to redress historical discrimination, holding that federal judges were 
justified in requiring aggressive remedial measures so long as minorities were being 
given an inadequate share of educational resources (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
Board of Education, 1971).  Under this substantive approach to equal protection, 
apparently neutral policies needed to be assessed based on an empirical record that was 
“long and wide,” meaning that judges would assess equal rights by looking at both 
evidence of historical racism and statistical analyses of racially disproportionate 
outcomes.  The emphasis on proportional outcomes for racial minorities places this 
jurisprudence squarely within the program advanced by the U.S. liberal legal network.  
This was the milieu in which graduates of American law schools in the 1970s 
came of age professionally.  Unlike the previous generation of liberal lawyers who had 
sought out government legal work, the ambition of these young lawyers was to organize 
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high-profile litigation for a civil rights law firm. What in the early 1960s had been called 
the “professionalization of reform” had become by the end of that decade the 
“legalization of reform” (Teles, 2008: 52).  Public interest law firms operating with Ford 
Foundation funding were already organizing litigation campaigns on behalf of inner-city 
recipients of government services, rural farm workers, and minority public employees. 
Ambitious law school graduates, steeped in the values of civil rights multiculturalism, 
sought out an area in which they too could make their mark. 
Immigration questions had not yet fallen under the purview of any existing law 
reform organization.  In part, this was because transient and vulnerable immigrant 
communities had until recently had difficulty finding political supporters.  U.S. Latino 
groups were still in the process of embracing their multicultural identity and abandoning 
their prior political strategy of identifying themselves as “other whites” (San Miguel, 
1987).  Moreover, the majority of liberal elites were wary of defending undocumented 
migrants at a time when Cesar Chavez was still advocating stricter immigration controls 
(Tichenor, 2002: 226). Although civil rights multiculturalism supplied reform-minded 
lawyers with a template of broad principles and approaches, the extent to which 
constitutional rights could be extended to non-citizens remained an open legal question. 
In order to frame immigrants as rights-bearing formal legal subjects, both legal and 
political ingenuity would be required.  In what follows, I briefly describe two of the early 
immigrant rights litigation campaigns in order to highlight some of the juridical 
innovations produced by the young lawyers who pioneered the field of “immigrant rights 
lawyering.” 
The first significant legal mobilization to test the civil rights approach to 
immigration issues, would end in the Supreme Court’s Plyler decision, took place in 
Texas starting in the mid-1970s.  The litigation campaign challenging Texas’s restriction 
on the public education for undocumented migrants was from the beginning inseparable 
from the legacy of affirmative action and multiculturalism. The attorneys steering the 
class action lawsuitsx combined in Plyler were deeply embedded in the U.S. liberal legal 
network: Peter Schey had recently created a Legal Services Corporation “immigration 
law back-up center” in Los Angeles Peter, while Peter Roos was the legal director for the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), a Ford Foundation 
grant recipient. Given the organizational and ideological commitments of the litigators, it 
is not surprising that the primary thrust of their arguments was that the purportedly 
racially-neutral legislation was in fact saturated with invidious racism. By arguing that 
Texas’s undocumented immigrants are a “minority within a minority” (Schey Brief, 
1981: 24) and that “the public schools provide virtually the only opportunity that many of 
these children will have to interact with the majority society” (MALDEF Brief, 1980: 
17), advocates effectively cast their clients within a race-based mold, softening the 
distinction between “alienage” and “lineage.”  
 In addition to eliding differences between Mexican-Americans, Mexican legal 
immigrants, and undocumented Mexican immigrants, litigators’ arguments were 
predicated in other ways upon a civil rights multiculturalist approach.  For example, the 
interpretation of the equal protection clause presented in the case was a distinctly pluralist 
one.  The plaintiff children were a prime example of “a discrete and insular minority 
requiring heightened judicial solicitude because they have been subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment” (MALDEF Brief 1980: 8) This statement applies to 
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undocumented immigrants the approach, developed in Footnote Four and applied in the 
civil rights cases of the 1950s and 1960s, that implicitly assumes not only that racial 
inequalities originate in purposeful racism but also that they are ultimately fixable.  
According to the plaintiffs’ arguments in Plyler, Mexican undocumented school children 
are no different than “children of other immigrant groups” in their knowledge of their 
ancestry. In sum, Plyler was built as a defense of Hispanics, and immigrants were 
understood to represent the most vulnerable segment of this group.    
A second illustration of how the civil rights multiculturalist framework was 
juridically adapted to immigration issues is provided by a litigation campaign, organized 
at the same time as the Plyler litigation, which sought to overturn the interdiction and 
detention policies directed against Haitian migrants arriving by sea on the coast of South 
Florida. While the arguments about access to public education had addressed border 
control only indirectly, the litigation challenging the interdiction policies of the 
Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) posed a much more direct challenge to 
national immigration policy. 
Under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, INS officials set in place a 
program in July and August 1978 to accelerate the immigration and asylum processing of 
undocumented Haitian “boat-people.” The District Director was told to cease requiring 
immigration judges within his district to suspend deportation proceedings upon the filing 
of an asylum claim, and also to cease the practice of allowing aliens 10 days for the 
preparation of applications to withhold deportation. Starting in late 1978, a legal 
challenge to the “Haitian Program” was organized on behalf of the Haitian Refugee 
Center, a non-profit organization directed by charismatic exiled Haitian priest Gerard 
Jean-Juste.  The case was first conceived by Ira Kurzban, a recent law school graduate 
who had come to Miami only a few months earlier, and who had contacts with the 
Haitian Refugee Center through his law school professor, NY-based radical labor 
defender Leonard Boudin.  Within a short period of time, Kurzban was joined by Peter 
Schey, fresh from the litigation in the Texas school cases, and by Rick Swartz, another 
young lawyer who had participated in some of his DC firm’s pro bono work for the 
NAACP and who had been hired by the Washington Lawyers Committee to organize an 
immigrant rights project.  
The attorneys representing the Haitian migrants argued that the District Director 
of the INS Miami office had denied the 5th Amendment due process rights of the class 
members by refusing to give them a meaningful hearing and that he had likewise violated 
their 5th Amendment equal protection rights by removing the right to petition for asylum 
on the basis of national origin (HRC Plaintiff Briefs, 1980). They emphasized the 
racialized identity of Haitian asylum seekers, arguing that the underlying reason why 
their clients had been subjected to intentional “national origin” discrimination was that 
the plaintiffs were part of the first substantial flight of black refugees from a repressive 
regime to the United States. Taking a page from civil rights jurisprudence that relied on 
statistical differences to demonstrate discrimination, they presented evidence that other 
asylum seekers, such as Nicaraguans, were permitted to work while their asylum claims 
are pending and that Cuban asylum seekers uniformly received asylum. The advocates 
were successful in communicating to the court that invidious racial prejudice lay behind 
this evidence, to the extent that the first sentence of Judge King’s decision stated, “This 
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case involves thousands of black Haitian nationals” (Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 
1980: 451).xi  
Even before the 5th Circuit affirmed the immigrant rights victory against the 1978 
“Haitian program,” the newly elected Reagan Administration enacted a new and 
aggressively control-oriented set of immigration policies. In response, immigrant rights 
attorneys argued that these practices were merely a continuation of the pattern of racial 
discrimination against black refugees. In the class action brought in July 1981, they 
reapplied legal arguments from in their previous case, suggested that, “black Haitian 
asylum seekers are the first substantial flight of black refugees who have come to our 
shores seeking political asylum,” and that “the INS had never before treated any other 
race or nationality in this manner” (HRC Brief, 1985: 4, 18). Attorneys introduced 
statistical analysis to show that INS detention policies had had a disproportionate impact 
on Haitians as compared with other similarly situated excludable aliens such as Cubans 
and Nicaraguans.  For the plaintiffs, this evidence pointed to “a pattern of discrimination 
as stark as Gomillion v. Lightfoot” (1985: 12), the famous voting rights case in which the 
Supreme Court had found that it was not necessary to prove discriminatory intent where 
disproportionate racial impact was evidence of discriminatory purpose. The case went 
through several appeals, all of which focused on the equal protection issue. 
 When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, immigrant rights attorneys 
presented their arguments in even more explicitly racial terms.  Referring to the 11th 
Circuit’s deleterious reading of the equal protection rights of excludable aliens, advocates 
for the Haitians told the Supreme Court: 
 
Not since the Dred Scott decision has this or any other court ever held that a class of persons is 
wholly immune from constitutional protection…. The discriminatory application of prolonged 
incarceration to Haitians occurred in the context of a lengthy historical pattern of discrimination 
by INS officials against black Haitian refugees…INS officials have denied Haitians their rights 
and have shipped them, like cattle, to remote areas of America. (HRC Brief, 1985: 4-14) 
 
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Swann, the attorneys suggested that an explicit 
extension of equal protection rights in this case would be a logical progression from 
Congress’s 1965 immigration reforms that had “eliminated the vestiges of invidious 
racial or nationality based discrimination in the immigration statutes” (1985: 44) by 
eliminating the national-origins system. Just as in the Texas school litigation, the rights of 
Haitian migrants were constructed by racializing immigrant identity and racial 
discrimination was framed as the primary obstacle to the realization of immigrant rights. 
French Juridical Framing: Immigrants and Republican Social 
Rights 
 
The roots of the politics of rights that emerged in France in the 1970s lie in opposition 
during the 1960s to the authoritarian tendencies that characterized the Fifth Republic 
under President de Gaulle. Republican political clubs, with opposition politician François 
Mitterrand a prominent figure, began to focus on the themes of decentralization and of 
subjecting government to legality. Although Mitterrand had been an insider within the 
Fourth Republic, he vocally opposed the newly centralized power of the Fifth Republic 
presidency on the grounds that it threatened individual liberties.  For most of the decade, 
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however, these discussions were confined to a small circle of elites estranged from the 
established political parties and they failed to gain popular currency. 
The events of 1968 transformed French politics with an infusion of energy 
embodying a “cultural leftism” detached from institutional channels.  This efflorescence 
of criticism strongly rejected organizational dogma and espoused a greater diversity of 
causes than traditional syndicalism. Its vocabulary was strongly influenced by France’s 
political tradition of solidarism, kept alive by the French Communist Party and its 
electorate, even as the new non-Communist left sought to criticize hierarchy and 
materialism (Touchard, 1977). Represented most visibly by Michel Foucault, leftist 
intellectuals provided high-profile support to the Maoist and Trotskyist groups that 
proliferated in the years immediately after 1968. These groups aimed to foment a “war of 
liberation” against the capitalist system by implanting activists among the in both urban 
factories and rural communities to reeducate the masses. The government’s repression of 
both student protesters and radical activist groups served to further concentrate 
previously diffuse currents of dissent.  
Within the legal profession, the apparent excesses of police power in the 
aftermath of May 1968 served to galvanize previously politically unengaged jurists.  
Venerable liberal associations such as the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme were revitalized 
by the arrival of new members (Agrikoliansky, 2002), and so were the republican 
political clubs, particularly Robert Badinter’s Droit et Démocratie.  New organizations 
such as the Mouvement d’Action Judiciaire placed their focus of defending the rights of 
those within the criminal justice system.  Eventually, even traditional unions were infused 
by the spirit of the times.  The Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail 
(CFDT) labor union created a legal department dedicated to developing a strong 
“revindicative” activism in the courts on behalf of workers (Willemez, 2003: 27).  
This leftist legal network, the gauche juridique, initially remained a loose 
assemblage of individuals and associations.  Legal activism reflected the left’s new 
diversity of causes, ranging from traditional syndicalism to newer movements for legal 
access to abortion, anti-nuclear environmentalism, and the rights of prisoners.  
Participants shared a common assumption that law could be used to make existing 
structures of power, whether of the police or official profession organizations, more 
participative. However, the traditional language of the left remained an integral 
vocabulary for this new legal activism.  Existing power structures would be made more 
transparent and participative and lacunae in the Etat de Droit would be filled. But the 
presumption was that the resulting more coherent legal system would uphold the 
principles of a state with responsibility for ensuring the social and economic welfare of 
its citizens.   
The synthesis of solidarism and Republican legality is epitomized by Badinter’s 
Liberté, Libertés, written at the request of François Mitterrand and extending beyond 
political tract to develop a comprehensive statement of program of this emergent gauche 
juridique (Badinter, 1976).  The book is an edited collection comprised of contributions 
from forty intellectuals and public figures. Badinter’s leftist “charter of liberties” 
endorses a society that assures the liberties of all of its component groups, not just those 
whose favored socio-economic background allows them to maintain their rights.  It 
argues against a system based on pure liberalism, which has no guarantee of social 
inclusion for disadvantaged groups (be they those who cannot find work, women, the 
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handicapped, the elderly, foreigners, or the imprisoned). When government is left to the 
discretion of state managers and there is an absence of “common will” or “community,” 
liberty is imperiled (Badinter, 1976: 267).  The text identifies the basis of legal rights 
with the revolutionary vocabulary of France’s left: only when the “real needs of the 
majority” are met will social relations be transformed so as to ensure individual liberty 
(Badinter, 1976: 269). At the same time, it infuses the solidaristic leftist program with 
principles of legality that were newly ascendant in the post-1968 period: anti-
authoritarian struggles for the rights of women and minorities, defense of regional 
autonomy, and environmentalism are recognized not as secondary but rather as 
“inseparable from industrial struggle” (Badinter, 1976: 269).  This discursive synthesis 
traces a new vision of the State as a socially-supportive vessel from which none should 
be excluded and whose operation relies that it adhere to legal procedures rather than the 
cut-throat logic of the free market.   
A generation of young French legal professionals - including both those trained 
for private practice and those trained for service within the state administration - came of 
age within this ideological context and were moved towards political engagement.  Some 
had participated in the events of May-June 1968, while others simply witnessed the post-
1968 political aftermath.  Like their classmates trained for careers in medicine, social 
work, architecture, and psychiatry, they felt alienated from the traditional institutions of 
the state and sought to reexamine their expert training through a lens freed from 
traditional hierarchical structures (Artières, 2008).  Michel Foucault’s model of the 
intellectuel-specifique was particularly attractive, and based on Foucault’s example of 
gathering a group to rethink France’s penal regime, other groups of young professionals 
searched for social issues in which they could self-reflectively apply their training and 
thus practically advance a program of reform. 
Immigrant activists had themselves recently begun to mobilize on behalf of better 
working conditions and against racism, building on informal circles linked to anti-
colonial organizations in their countries of origin and supported by a loose network of 
grassroots Catholic social justice associations (Escafré-Dublet, 2008).  The leadership of 
the two main French labor unions did not support these movements, favoring policies of 
immigration restriction (Haus, 2002). Moreover, migrant sending countries actively 
lobbied to maintain their position as sole representative of immigrants’ political interests 
in a bid to maintain their attachment to the homeland.  
By the early 1970s, the cause of immigrant workers had been adopted by reform-
minded legal networks amenable to embracing new causes whose members sought to use 
their legal training to protect the disadvantaged. When, in 1972, the government’s 
immigration policies shifted towards restrictionism, the mobilizations of immigrants and 
their supporters achieved a higher profile. The Groupe d’Information et de Soutien des 
Travailleurs Immigrés (GISTI), which had strong institutional and ideological ties to 
France’s nascent gauche juridique, supplied the anchor for a new constellation of young 
attorneys, judges, and legally-trained public administrators with an interest in mobilizing 
law in support of immigrant causes.  
 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, French legal professionals did not have an 
extensive body of recent rights-oriented jurisprudence on which to build their claims.  
The Constitutional Council had recently rendered justiciable the rights-based provisions 
of previous constitutional texts (See Stone, 1992).  But it was not obvious that this “bloc 
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constitutionnel” could be applied against administrative action, since the Constitutional 
Council only had the power to review the text of statutes before they were enacted into 
law and had no power of judicial review over either laws already in application or 
administrative policies.  In order to challenge government immigration policies, French 
litigators would need to bring their cases before the Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest 
administrative court, and would need to convince France’s elite administrative 
adjudicators that they should apply constitutional principles.  Finally, the Conseil d’Etat 
would need to be convinced through skilled legal argumentation that immigrant workers 
were legal subjects whose rights were guaranteed under French principles of law. 
The first significant test of whether courts would be receptive to rights-based 
claims on behalf of immigrants was a challenge to the controversial Marcellin-Fontanet 
circulars restricting the granting of residency and work permits to non-citizens.xii  
Challenges were brought against the Marcellin-Fontanet circulars almost as soon as they 
had been issued.  Members of GISTI’s “commission on housing” drafted a response 
focusing on the argument that the state had not met its responsibility to provide decent 
housing to immigrant workers, while another GISTI working group calling itself the 
“commission on labor rights” argued that the regulation would have the effect of giving 
the employer control over the labor contract (Israel, 2003). The legal department of the 
CFDT was approached and convinced to bring a case against the circulars in its own 
name.xiii  
The legal case against the 1972 circulars illustrates the way in which the discourse 
of France’s gauche juridique was at this time beginning to fuse leftist and republican 
values.  The arguments raised before the Conseil d’Etat in the plaintiffs’ briefs centered 
on the constitutional principle of the right to work and asserted that the essence of this 
right was the freedom of workers to seek employment wherever they wished rather than 
being tied to a particular employer (Waquet Note, 1973). The circular’s provision 
removing the temporary residence card was argued to effectively bind immigrant workers 
to their employers because if they sought employment elsewhere they would lose their 
residence permit.  Similarly, the provision conditioning residence and work 
authorizations on the employer’s commitment to supply adequate housing were seen by 
advocates for immigrants as an instance of employers and the state jointly exercising 
greater social control over foreign workers.  Pluralist theories had no place in these legal 
arguments since jurists assumed that, because of the way the system was structured, 
workers as a group could never expect to achieve a proportionate share of the nation’s 
wealth.   
The gauche juridique synthesis of solidarism and legalism is clearly visible in the 
arguments against the provisions in the circulars linking the validity of work and 
residency permits.   Immigrant rights advocates argued that resident immigrants such as 
Da Silva should not be placed in a precarious position every time they went to renew 
their work permits.  They suggested that the circulars illegally changed a well-defined 
existing regime in which labor contracts, once signed by the employer and employee 
were not assumed to have any fixed expiration. Immigrant workers who had been given 
an employment contract should be considered to be part of the national community, they 
argued. They need not continuously ask for permission to stay.  French republicanism 
had long held that Frenchmen were created through the socializing processes of schools, 
the military, and public employment.  The arguments made against the circulars gave 
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these liberal ideas a leftist flavor by suggesting that, just as work was used to create the 
nation, those who were working should have the same rights as citizens.  Immigrant 
workers were citizens in spirit.   
Finally, the case is illustrative of the reluctance of France’s political left to define 
immigrants in racial-ethnic terms.  Administrators were well aware at this time that 
decisions on work and residence permits issued at the level of the prefectoral guichet 
were likely to discriminate against Algerians, and this was one motivation behind the 
circulars’ provisions enhancing prefectoral discretion (Weil, 1991). Despite indications 
that the government’s restrictionist policies were directed particularly against Algerian 
Muslim migrants, the representative plaintiff for the suit against the Marcellin-Fontanet 
circulars was a Portuguese immigrant.  The racial identity of the plaintiff was not 
important since he was a representative of the class of immigrant workers that GISTI and 
the CFDT were dedicated to representing. 
The Conseil d’Etat decided against the government and nullified the Marcellin-
Fontanet circulars.  The judges justified their decision primarily on technical grounds and 
brought no explicit evolution in jurisprudential principles.  Nevertheless, the decision was 
seen by some as a sign that the Conseil d’Etat was willing to scrutinize government 
policy making in the area of immigration, itself a new development since until this point 
immigration policy allowed complete administrative discretion.  
Between 1974 and 1977 the government gave immigrant rights advocates a 
number of additional opportunities to go to court, issuing a stream of restrictive 
immigration policies.xiv  In December 1978, the Conseil d’Etat declared a number of 
these regulations and programs illegal.  Some of the policies in question had been aborted 
by the government even before their legality could be reviewed by the Conseil d’Etat, 
and so these decisions were over-shadowed by the last decision that the Section des 
Contentieux issued in this avalanche of reversals of government policy: the GISTI 
decision which created a right for immigrants to family regroupment.    
At issue was a November 1977 decree guaranteeing the right of immigrants with 
at least three years residence in France to bring their immediate family members to join 
them, but making family migration conditional upon the agreement of those seeking 
residence permits not to take up any employment.  The decree’s legality was attacked by 
GISTI and the CFDT, as well as by another trade union, the Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT). The advocates began by making right to work arguments similar to those 
used against the Marcellin-Fontanet circulars, claiming that the decree amounted to a 
fundamental change in the right to work, something which, according to Article 34 of the 
Constitution, only the legislature could enact. The CFDT also argued that the decree 
violated the text of the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946, which created an 
aspirational right to work by saying that “everyone has the obligation to work and the 
right to obtain employment” (cited in Dondoux, 1979: 11). 
The decree was also challenged for violating a right to family regroupment.  The 
European Social Charter, ratified by France in October 1974, contained a provision that 
required contracting states to facilitate migrant family regroupment. The language of the 
Preamble to France’s 1946 Constitution, saying, “the nation will assure to each individual 
and to families the conditions necessary for their development,” seemed to suggest 
something similar.  The 1977 decree prohibited regroupment only for those who wished 
to enter the labor force, but GISTI attorneys argued that by curtailing the right to obtain 
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employment the decree impinged on the social protections that were central to their 
interpretation of the right to family life (cited in Dondoux, 1979: 12).  The decree was yet 
another example of the administration regulating the situation of immigrants through a 
process of “infra-droit,” or non-law, that created a “Kafka-esque universe” where law 
could change from one day to the next, thereby depriving immigrants of social rights and 
“exacerbating their already precarious material situation” (GISTI Note, 1978).  
In emphasizing the identity of immigrants as workers, members of France’s 
gauche juridique avoided any mention of migrants’ racial-ethnic identities. Rather than 
focusing on representing Algerians, who would be most immediately impacted by the 
decision, immigrant rights advocacy encompassed all immigrant workers without 
distinction.  France’s Constitution commits “the nation” to assuring certain basic rights 
without mention of citizenship, and bilateral guest worker agreements that protect 
immigrant workers’ social rights similarly “assimilate” the nationals of one contracting 
party with the nationals of the other contracting party (Lyon-Caen Note, 1974).  
According to the framework developed by left legal networks during the 1970s, 
immigrant workers contributing their labor to the nation become a part of the nation and 
acquire legal rights. 
PART III: LAW’S SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF IMMIGRATION 
POLITICS 
 
Litigation campaigns organized by liberal/left legal networks not only resulted in 
important judicial victories that articulated new jurisprudential principles of immigrant 
rights but also supplied the discursive frameworks on which these decisions were based. 
Beyond shaping the way in which courts adjudicate cases, have these decisions and the 
principles they enunciate contributed to any broader shift in the politics of migration? 
The period of the late 1970s and early 1980s has been identified as a critical juncture for 
what has variously been termed the “judicialization of immigration” (Gomes, 2000; 
Soennecken, 2008) and the “transformation of immigration law” (Schuck, 1984).  What 
is the lasting legacy of liberal/left juridical framings of rights-bearing immigrants? 
Just as the previous section examined the interplay between law and society 
through a discursive lens, showing how legal mobilizations by actors outside the courts 
laid the groundwork on which courts constructed immigrants as rights-bearing subjects, 
this section will explore some of the ways in which a discursive analysis allows us to 
better understand the contribution of judicial enunciations of rights to the broader politics 
of immigration.  I argue that in both the U.S. and France, the long-term impact of these 
cases extended beyond their direct policy outcomes or the legal precedents they created 
for subsequent litigation. Once endowed with the judiciary’s political legitimacy, the 
“pluralist civil rights” and “republican social rights” framings of immigrants can be 
understood as constituting significant symbolic actants (Latour, 2005) in their own right, 
leaving their mark on immigration reform programs in the 1980s and beyond. 
Constructing U.S. Immigration Politics through Immigrant Civil Rights 
 
In order to understand the way in which legal mobilization contributed to symbolically 
reshaping immigration politics, we need to first examine the political discourse around 
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immigration that prevailed among American liberals during the preceding decade. For 
most of the 1970s, migrant communities found it difficult to locate political support for 
their cause. Eventually, prodded by a new generation of Chicano activists, Mexican-
American professionals and business leaders overcame their reluctance to associate 
themselves with impoverished Mexican migrants (Chavez, 2002).  But the United Farm 
Workers, and the labor movement more generally, saw migrants as a threat to organizing 
efforts, and this significantly impacted the immigration policy positions of Democratic 
Party politicians with strong labor constituencies (Haus, 2002).  Moreover, throughout 
the 1970s, black legislators continued to see employer sanctions as way to curb 
undocumented migration and job displacement (Tichenor, 2002: 235).  Thus, 
immigration was framed in primarily materialist terms during this period.  Immigrants 
were seen as threats to the economic balance of the welfare state, something that most 
liberals wanted to preserve. 
 It was thus not at all obvious that the civil rights framing of immigrants would 
acquire political currency.  While some politicians strongly wanted to increase 
immigration quotas, the Democratic Party as a whole was divided on immigration issues. 
Congress’s decision in the fall of 1978 to create a Select Commission on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy (“The Hesburgh Commission”) was in large part an attempt to find a way 
to bridge these seemingly intractable differences (Tichenor, 2002: 233).   The hope was 
that the commission would broker a compromise. 
 It was at this formative moment that legal mobilizations against the Carter 
Administration’s Haitian refugee policy burst onto the political scene. The lawyers 
representing the Haitian migrants consciously understood themselves as molding 
immigration into a new civil rights movement.  The exhaustive trial between the fall of 
1979 and the spring of 1980, in which the plaintiffs placed particular rhetorical emphasis 
on the racial identity of Haitian asylum seekers, provided an opportunity to build a 
political coalition between civil rights groups and immigrant supporters. In the spring of 
1980, advocates for the Haitian plaintiffs succeeded in convincing members of the 
Hesburgh Commission to travel to Miami, where they heard the testimony of 500 Haitian 
refugees.  Later that year, again as part of a political strategy to garner support for the 
litigation, advocates organized meetings on Capitol Hill for Haitians to personally 
describe their experiences, energizing the Congressional Black Caucus Haitian 
Taskforce.  With the ground thus prepared, the decision in September 1981 by a Nixon-
appointed federal judge to issue a temporary restraining order against the INS garnered 
legitimacy for a civil rights framing of immigrants. 
 The Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti trial illustrates the potential of litigation to 
mobilize legal symbols to gain leverage and catalyze support.  It reaped some important 
early results, with the Carter Administration agreeing to negotiate and eventually 
announcing in June 1980 that it would parole into the U.S. all of the Haitian plaintiffs.  
More importantly in the long-run, the framing of refugees as a racially disadvantaged 
minority was influential in convincing leading black legislators who had previously 
opposed refugee legislation to vote for the 1980 Refugee Act (Gimpel and Edwards, 
1999: 131).  Finally, the Haitian litigation further enhanced the credibility of immigrant 
rights advocates, the most immediate effect of which was that litigator Peter Schey was 
hired into a legal research position with the Hesburgh Commission. 
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 The Hesburgh Commission’s report, released in March 1981, which advocated 
controlling unauthorized migration but doing so in a way that protects alien rights, set the 
political context for Congressional immigration debates over the next five years. With 
immigration reform beginning to gain momentum, litigator Rick Swartz left his position 
at the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights in the summer of 1981 and 
sought funding from the Ford Foundation for a new lobbying organization – the National 
Immigration Forum - that would bring the civil rights approach to immigration directly 
into the political sphere.  
 In June 1982, two important court decisions solidified the framing of immigration 
as a civil rights issue.  The Supreme Court decision in Plyler was read as a stinging 
indictment of federal inaction on immigration reform.  Justice Brennan’s decision 
presented amnesty as the only feasible policy alternative, since massive deportation 
would potentially expose undocumented migrants to civil rights abuses.  The same month 
that the Supreme Court issued its decision, a District Court in South Florida handed 
litigators another victory in their campaign for Haitian asylum seekers.  Judge Spellman 
held that the Reagan Administration’s detention practices violated standards of legality 
and ordering that Haitians be released from detention so long as they had an individual 
sponsor while pursuing their asylum claims (Louis v. Nelson 1982). The decision was 
widely reported in legal circles. Both the American Bar Association and the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association issued press statements supporting the goals of 
immigrant civil rights advocacy (AILA, 1996).xv 
 These decisions contributed to the nascent National Immigration Forum “getting a 
seat at the table” in Congressional immigration debates (Swartz, 2006).  The new non-
partisan immigration lobby, consisting of ethnic and religious groups and immigration 
lawyers, forged a civil rights-themed immigration coalition with the potential to exerted 
significant influence.  As a participant in this political coalition, the Congressional Black 
Caucus, which had previously strongly supported employer sanctions, worked to defeat 
the inclusion of employer sanctions in the 1982 version of the immigration reform bill 
(Gimpel and Edwards, 1999: 140). Although the civil rights-immigration coalition was 
not ultimately able to prevent employer sanctions provisions from being included in the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act that was passed in October 1986, they succeeded in 
ensuring that procedures would be set up to periodically evaluate the impact of sanctions 
on job discrimination and that the Justice Department would pursue discrimination claims 
(Gimpel and Edwards, 1999: 168).   
 In the 1990s, the fully-flowered civil rights immigration lobby exerted a strong 
influence over debates. The “groups,” as the lobby came to be known, successfully 
blocked proposals in 1990 for more exacting employer sanctions and employment 
verification technology (Gimpel and Edwards, 1999: 193). This coalition, whose 
existence was made possible by the civil rights framing of immigration, deepened at the 
end of the decade to include the AFL-CIO, which for pragmatic reasons switched its 
position on immigration and adopted a strategy that focused on organizing immigrant 
workers, becoming an active supporter of the National Immigration Forum (Haus, 2002: 
73).  AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland joined members of the Leadership Conference 
on Civil Rights in lobbying for more vigorous enforcement of job anti-discrimination 
protections for Latinos and Asians (Tichenor, 2002: 263). And black legislators, such as 
Representative Mel Watt, continued to be active on immigration issues, bringing an 
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overriding concern with procedural justice and civil rights to this policy area (Gimpel and 
Edwards, 1999: 231). 
 The civil rights-immigration lobby continues to make its presence felt in 
immigration policymaking circles (DeParle, 2011). Recent work on U.S. immigration 
politics suggests that this civil rights framing, while not hegemonic, has lost none of its 
potency (Newton, 2008). 
U.S. legal liberalism framed the struggles of immigrants against restrictionist 
policies as a new form of civil rights. The civil rights components of IRCA, and the 
ongoing civil rights framing of immigration issues more generally, were made possible 
by political coalitions which were catalyzed by judicially-enunciated framings of 
immigrant rights during the 1970s and early 1980s. While courts were not willing to 
wholly subsume immigration under the protections of strict scrutiny, they were unwilling 
to dismiss immigrant rights claims entirely.  The civil rights approach to immigration, 
which exerted substantial power over the U.S. politics of immigration, changing the way 
that key players understood the issues, was formulated and legitimized through legal 
mobilizations for immigrant rights.  
Constructing French Immigration Politics through Immigrant Social Rights 
 
The political discourse around immigration that prevailed in France during the early 
1970s was resolutely materialist.  French administrative elites in the decades after WWII 
made no serious efforts to promote the social insertion of immigrant workers, assuming 
that they would return to their countries of origin when their labor was no longer needed 
(Lochak, 1985: 157). This was the dominant view among politicians on the political right, 
who saw immigrant workers as dispensable sources of labor (Viet, 1998: 385).  
Anchoring the political left in the early 1970s, François Mitterrand spoke about 
immigrant workers as one of the many groups exploited by the capitalist class (Viet, 
1998: 397) and his 1972 “Common Program” made no mention of immigrants requiring 
any special protection. In general, France’s political class was loath to admit that colonial 
groups, against whom it had recently suffered humiliating defeats, were owed any kind of 
right to residency (Weil, 1991: 111).  Thus, while they differed in their assessments of 
immigrants’ working conditions, French politicians and policymakers did not envision 
post-war immigrants as potential members of the Republic’s political community. 
 The publication of the Conseil d’Etat’s 1975 Da Silva decision, overturning the 
Marcellin-Fontanet circulars, provided an important impetus for France’s various 
immigrant communities and their small but growing group of supporters to band together 
under the cause of immigrant social rights. The 1972 circulars, which made it harder to 
obtain a residence permit, elicited hunger strikes by migrants. Grassroots support groups 
initially eschewed juridical tactics, taking the principled position that all papers should be 
done away with since there should be no divisions within the working-class (Ginesy-
Galano, 1984).  The Conseil d’Etat’s willingness to scrutinize government policymaking, 
even though it was based primarily on technical grounds, prompted the movement for 
defense of immigrants to focus their efforts on the more pragmatic goal of defending the 
right to have papers (Marek, 2002).  The judicial decision was seen as a vindication for 
the diverse grassroots coalition comprised of Portuguese, Maghrebin, and African 
migrants which had organized protests in the name of all immigrant workers against the 
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circulars (Bouziri, 1990).  A political identity was thereby cemented, with migrants of 
multiple nationalities increasingly identifying themselves as “immigrant workers with 
rights.” 
 This movement-building gained further momentum in response to the much more 
draconian policies adopted, starting in 1977, by the Giscard government.  The economic 
crisis that ended France’s period of post-war economic growth was now seen as durable, 
and the government experimented with a number of administrative initiatives aimed at 
ensuring the return of immigrant workers to their countries of origin. In response, 
immigrants and their supporters mobilized to claim their place within French society, 
proposing to accord foreigners the right to vote in local elections and thus crystallizing an 
agenda for a formerly diffuse movement (Blanc-Chaléard, 2001). Associative leaders 
who had previously spoken in Marxist terms of promoting the interests and needs of the 
immigrant proletariat now increasingly adopted the language of rights to frame their 
claims (Viet, 1998: 404).  
 The Conseil d’Etat’s 1978 GISTI decision responded to this debate, intervening 
against the Giscard government. According to the court, migrants who have been 
authorized to reside in France have the right to live as a family and to enjoy basic legal 
protections.  They cannot have their applications for work or residence treated en masse 
and they cannot be summarily expelled.  The decision was read by doctrinal 
commentators as extending full social rights to foreigners in France.  The right to family 
life was interpreted as implying the right for migrant families to have the possibility of 
work, i.e. the right to look for work, to obtain professional training, and to be provided 
with unemployment insurance (Hamon, 1979: 664).  Moreover, it was suggested that the 
principle of guaranteeing a right to family life to all those who are resident under the 
state’s authority might easily be extended to provide immigrants with other rights, such 
as bodily integrity and protection against attacks on human dignity (Hamon, 1979: 664).     
 The decision had an important impact on French politics, setting the context for 
legislative debates leading up to the 1981 election.  The Conseil d’Etat’s authoritative 
criticism, particularly since it was based on constitutional guarantees, was useful to those 
wishing to stigmatize the government.  Opposition politicians calculated that taking up 
the cause of immigrant rights was an effective political strategy.  Labor union leaders, 
including the CFDT’s Hubert Lésire-Ogrel, spoke explicitly in rights-based terms when 
challenging the government’s immigration proposals, saying that “fundamental liberties 
are in jeopardy, the right of immigrants to live and to have a family life and a future…the 
forced departure of immigrants touches too many essential things for us not to struggle 
against it” (Weil, 1991: 177). Hunger strikes against the expulsion of young migrants that 
took place during the 1981 presidential campaign were supported by the Ligue des Droits 
de l’Homme, which embraced the immigrant cause.  François Mitterrand likewise 
positioning himself as a defender of immigrant rights, finding in a rights-based 
immigration framework, which demonstrated his currency with the new post-1968 social 
movements, a valuable weapon to use not only against the government but also against 
his communist competitors within the left (Viet, 1998). Three of the proposals in 
Mitterrand’s 110 Propositions, which were both a personal manifesto and a summation of 
left’s political program in 1981, concerned immigrants.  Mitterrand proposed giving non-
citizens voting rights in local elections as well as full associational rights. He wrote that 
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these rights were necessary so that immigrants, who as a group were particularly 
disfavored, might have the opportunity to fully participate in society. 
 This prise de position had lasting effects following the left’s 1981 presidential 
victory, not least because during the campaign Mitterrand had presented himself as 
offering voters a clear electoral program, a contract to break with the past and usher in a 
new political regime.  During the new government’s first year in office, fidelity to its 
electoral program guided its actions “to the point of fetishism” (Weil, 1991: 196).  The 
creation of a “Secretary of State for Immigrants” within the new Ministry of National 
Solidarity, which took over the immigration portfolio from the Ministry of Labor, was 
aimed to demonstrate symbolically that the nation’s solidarity was extended to all.  No 
longer would immigrants be seen simply as workers, meaning that education and social 
insertion programs were required to address their needs.  Minister Nicole Questiaux 
declared that her ministry’s actions would be guided by “solidarity with all, French and 
immigrants alike, without discrimination,” and she urged legislators to quickly reverse 
the previous policies made of “often illegal circulars, often hastily prepared, sometimes 
brutal declarations, and unpublished instructions,” and replace them with a politics 
founded on respect for immigrant human rights (Weil, 1991: 199).  The immigration law 
of 1981, granting foreigners associative rights as well as social security and 
unemployment benefits was a dramatic instantiation of this approach. 
 The impact of the Conseil d’Etat’s intervention was also felt among the political 
and intellectual classes who see themselves as representing France’s republican tradition. 
The idea that social and economic rights must be given as part of incorporation into the 
Republic had the effect of incorporating immigrant rights into the republican tradition.   
This principled line of reasoning was confirmed when, two months after its decision in 
the GISTI case, the Conseil d’Etat issued a scathing advisory opinion that characterized 
the Giscard government’s proposed immigration legislation as  
 
…contrary to republican traditions, to that which has constituted, since the Second World War, the 
spirit of France and the tradition of his politics of immigration… immigrant labor was sought out 
when it was needed; now that this need no longer exists, these workers are taken and sent back to 
their country (Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Stoléru Law, 1979).  
 
The Conseil d’Etat’s clearly enunciated position confirmed the intuitions of technocratic 
elites within the administration that the Giscard government’s aggressively restrictionist 
immigration program went a step too far (Weil, 1991: 186).  Moreover, Gaullist 
legislators could not accept a law that the Conseil d’Etat, the guardian of France’s 
republican tradition, had characterized as an attack on certain essential values of the 
republic.  Important figures such as André Postel-Vinay, Stanislas Mangin, and Georges 
Gorse drew on the Conseil d’Etat’s arguments to criticize the government during 
legislative debates (Weil, 1991: 186).xvi 
 We can see the durable effect of the rights-based framework for immigration 
when the political winds in France changed due to the rising electoral popularity of far-
right politicians promoting a discourse that equated immigration and insecurity. The 
Socialist Party’s unfavorable electoral showing in spring 1982 cantonal elections, and the 
sense that the 1981 regularization had produced negative political effects, prompted some 
ministers within the Mitterrand government to advocate a change in its position on 
immigration.  Nevertheless, during governmental debates, ministers such as Laurent 
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Fabius vocally insisted that a distinction be made between unlawful immigrants on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, lawful immigrants “who can and must stay” (Favier and 
Martin-Roland, 1997: 173).  Technocrats within the administration likewise took as given 
the legal principle that immigrants have human rights.  The legal advisor to the Ministry 
of Solidarity, Jean Massot, instructed his minister that his sense of the Conseil d’Etat’s 
jurisprudence was that immigrants and their families who had been in France for a long 
time deserved a guarantee of security (Viet, 1998: 414).  Mitterrand eventually pursued a 
compromise: regular migrants would be included and definitely given residence rights 
and irregular migrants would face a politics of exclusions.   
Although, at this time, neither France’s Conseil d’Etat nor its Constitutional 
Council had retrospective powers of judicial review to use as a stick against restrictionist 
statutes, legally authoritative pronouncements contributed to constructing a vision of 
immigrants that by the early 1980s was firmly institutionalized.  A public report assessing 
expert opinion on France’s politics of immigration identifies the 1982-1984 period as 
“completing the definition” and confirming the “new rules of the game” for immigration 
politics (Gaxie, 1995: 35).  The immigration law passed by the Mitterrand government in 
July 1984 brought about a “stabilization” in the terms of partisan debates (Viet, 1998: 
415). Although the 1984 law contained a number of provisions to finance voluntary 
repatriation of immigrants, a signal of the influence of the far-right on both political 
parties, it nevertheless introduced the ten-year residence card.  This replaced a regime in 
which mandatory annual or tri-annual application for renewal of residence authorization 
had kept immigrants in France in a state of permanent instability and represents a 
realization by the government and the parliament of the impossibility of sending post-war 
immigrants back to their countries of origin.  According to legal scholar and immigrant 
rights activist Danielle Lochak, the statute “concretized in law the recognition of a 
durable installation in France of immigrant populations and the dissociation of the right 
to residence from economic activity” (Lochak, 1985: 168). This outline for the politics of 
immigration “traced a line for all governments to come” (Blanc-Chaléard, 2010: 492). 
French governments in subsequent years would reinforce the rigor of border controls but 
would simultaneously express their commitment to integrating those already present.  
The discourse on immigration had changed and immigrant guestworkers who 
reconstructed France would no longer be seen as a temporary presence but would be 
incorporated into the republic. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In both the United States and France, the formal legal subject of the immigrant emerged 
in conjunction with an ascendant liberal/left political vision, with the effect that 
immigrant rights were articulated in terms of nationally-specific discursive frames.  Just 
as U.S. immigrant rights advocates sought to frame the rights of non-citizens within the 
ideology of pluralism and racial proportionality, French immigrant rights advocates cast 
the rights of immigrants within the frame of the state’s commitment to social rights.  In 
both instances, immigrants came under the legal protection of frameworks that had been 
developed in the context of struggles on behalf of African-Americans, on the one hand, 
and on behalf of the French working class on the other.    
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It is important to bear in mind that the construction of immigrants as bearers of 
rights, a process in which French and American legal networks played central roles, 
involved some significant flattening and distortion. To be sure, as Sassen points out, the 
thin formal subject of “the alien” is always in tension with a rich reality (Sassen, 2006: 
293).xvii  However, the paradigmatic “foreigner” or “alien” that appeared in precedent-
setting cases during the first wave of contemporary immigrant rights litigation was 
particularly one-dimensional, and often unrepresentative of the more complex self-
portrayals put forth by contemporaneous immigrant movements.  For example, in the 
U.S., Haitian immigrants certainly labeled INS policies as motivated by racism, but the 
often-tense relations between newly arrived Haitian migrants and Miami’s working-class 
African-American neighborhoods did not necessarily reflect the civil rights politics of 
liberal elites (Schiller and Fouron, 2005). Moreover, leaders of the Haitian immigrant 
community’s mobilization against refugee expulsions cast their actions as part of a larger 
protest against U.S. complicity in the abuses of the Aristide regime.  Similarly, immigrant 
groups in France were far more likely to draw on a vocabulary of colonial racism than 
were many of their French leftist elite supporters (Simeant, 1998). And relations on the 
factory floor between native French workers and immigrant workers did not always 
demonstrate industrial solidarity.  In both countries, as advocates working at the 
grassroots were well aware, immigrant political identities were dynamic and complex 
rather than ideologically fixed.   
While juridical translations of immigrant struggles into the language of each 
country’s dominant liberal/left legal discourse may have significantly altered the ways 
that immigrants portrayed themselves, in both the United States and France, these formal 
juridical representations came to have a significant long-term impact on the politics of 
immigration.  In France, advocacy before the Conseil d’Etat not only placed limits on 
administrative discretion but also strengthened an emerging leftist program to reinforce 
the rights of resident immigrants, elements of which were codified in the July 1984 
Immigration Law.  In the United States, immigrant rights litigation likewise contributed 
to legitimating the reformist components of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act, such as the general amnesty and the anti-discrimination safeguards on employer 
sanctions, and the civil rights framing of immigration politics continues to make itself 
felt.  By authoritatively sanctioning the figure of the immigrant as a minority within a 
minority or as the proletariat of the proletariat, juridically based advocacy on behalf of 
immigrants substantially defined the politics of immigration and set a formative baseline 
against which subsequent policymakers would respond. 
By creating our taken-for-granted assumptions about the relationship between 
non-citizens and the national community, law constitutes the discursive frames within 
which legal mobilization and judicial action can take place. Legal categories are not often 
debated in day-to-day politics, and perhaps for this reason they are often overlooked in 
studies of the politics of immigration. As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, 
knowledge production in the juridical field is strongly dependent upon context. In the 
judicialization of immigration politics, the identities of immigrant legal subjects and the 
frontiers of citizenship are themselves fluid and contested.   
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 Not all explanations of the “liberal constraint” on democratic preferences focus on the role of the courts.  
For scholars of legislative politics, the judiciary’s role has been trivial or ancillary to the play of interest 
groups and political parties.  According to Freeman, liberal immigration policies persist because their costs 
are diffuse and their benefits are concentrated, implying that those who benefit will be incented to lobby 
more actively than the majority who are disadvantaged by these policies. Freeman, G. P.1995 "Modes of 
Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." International Migration Review, 29 (4): 881-902.  
Schain is similarly focused on legislative politics, suggesting that relatively liberal immigration policies are 
an indicator that political parties see future gain from naturalizing immigrant voters, but that not all states 
are characterized by this party-driven domestic political dynamic. Schain, M. A. (2008), The Politics of 
Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States. Palgrave MacMillan: New York.  
ii
 For example, one such analysis points to the way in which the reasoning in Plyler provides support for 
theorizing Footnote Four equal protection doctrine as analytically separate from the principle of federal 
preemption Rubio Marin, R. (2000), Immigration as a Democratic Challenge. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton.. 
iii
 Thus, while he agrees with Schuck that U.S. courts have had a limited impact on immigration legislation, 
largely due to the persistence of the 19th century doctrine that the legislature has plenary power over 
immigration, Joppke nevertheless sees a relatively more extensive role for Germany’s “autonomous legal 
system” in shaping the politics of immigration Joppke, C. (1998), Immigration and the Nation-State: The 
United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Oxford University Press: New York.. 
iv
 The empirical research for this project included 86 in-depth personal interviews, 46 in the United States 
and 40 in France, with legal professionals who have made their career in the field of immigrant rights.  
v
 At that time, the U.S. Supreme Court was moving away from its previous obstructionism towards 
economic legislation.  The Court revised its standards for judicial review of constitutionality, declaring that 
the judiciary would defer to the legislature in matters of economic regulation and would require only that 
legislation be related to a legitimate state interest. See Tushnet, M. 2008 "The Rights Revolution in the 
Twentieth Century" In Cambridge History of Law in America. ed. M. Grossberg and C. Tomlins. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
vi
 The Court did not go as far in granting equal protection rights as some has urged it to do. In opting for 
intermediate scrutiny, Justice Brennan’s majority rejected a more rigorous “strict scrutiny” analysis. 
Moreover, the Court made it clear that its extension of equal protection rights to undocumented migrant 
children should not necessarily be read as precedent to support the extension of these rights to 
undocumented migrant adults. 
vii
 Pluralist theorists, such as Robert Dahl and David Truman, asserted that a monopolistic elite would be 
prevented from imposing its narrow class interests on society so long as political structures gave equal 
recognition to all competing groups and thereby forced them to compromise with one another Truman, D. 
(1951), The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 
Dahl, R. A.1957 "Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker." 
Journal of Public Law, 6.. 
viii
 In this respect, the theory fit well with the professional arrival in the 1960s of the third generation 
descendants of the wave of U.S. immigration that had peaked in 1910 Noiriel, G. (1996), The French 
Melting Pot. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.. 
ix
 Substantial grants went to the NAACP-LDF and the Mississippi office of the Lawyers’ Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law.  The Foundation also provided start-up funds to establish the Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Southwest Council of La Raza, the Native American Rights Fund, 
and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. 
x
 The litigation in Doe v Plyler was organized in 1978 by MALDEF as a test case in Federal District Court 
against the Texas law. In 1979, while the Plyler case was being heard by the judges of the 5th Circuit on 
appeal by the state, a consolidated statewide class action was approved in the Houston Federal District 
Court that aimed to address statewide issues so as to accelerate the process of allowing all undocumented 
children to return to school.  Peter Schey was recruited by local attorneys to organize this consolidated 
case, In re Alien Children Ed. Litigation.  In 1981, arguments in the Plyler case and in the consolidated 
Houston case were jointly heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
xi
 It did not hurt that Judge King was himself African-American. 
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xii
 Under the new regulations, prefects were instructed to veto requests for regularization if the immigrant’s 
employer could not show that after advertising the position for three weeks through the National 
Employment Agency (ANE) the agency had failed to find a worker to fill the position.xii  Prefects were also 
instructed to veto requests for regularization if the immigrant’s employer failed to provide adequate 
housing for the worker.  A denied request for regularization would result in an expulsion order.  The 
circulars also changed the rules for issuing residency and work cards for all immigrants, not just those 
making the initial attempt to regularize their status.  Prefects were instructed to replace the temporary work 
authorization card, previously issued during the first year of employment, with a one-year visa pasted onto 
the immigrant’s employment contract.  They were also instructed to ensure that the residence cards they 
issued to non-citizens would last no longer than the duration of the work permits. 
xiii
 Since GISTI was not yet registered as an official association, another case was brought by GISTI’s 
members in the name of a Portuguese immigrant and CFDT unionist, Antonio Da Silva, who held work and 
residency permits, but for whom it was argued the circulars would impose multiple obstacles when it came 
time to renew these permits. The two cases were consolidated when they were finally heard by the Conseil 
d’Etat in January 1975. 
xiv
 Litigation was brought against three November 1974 circulars that suspended all new labor immigration 
and all family immigration.  Cases were also organized against another circular passed the same month that 
placed conditions on the issuance of residence permits, and two others that attempted to restrict migration 
to France by citizens of France’s former black African colonies.  The government’s “return assistance 
program,” promulgated by memorandum in June 1977, was also the object of litigation before the Conseil 
d’Etat. 
xv
 Over the ensuing months, the American Bar Association and the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association combined efforts to provide two thousand geographically diverse pro bono lawyers to represent 
Haitians making asylum claims. Thus, an unexpected consequence of the decision was that it prompted the 
private bar to become active in immigration politics. 
xvi
 Weil suggests that this indicates that discrete contacts existed between the Conseil d’Etat and like-
minded Gaullist politicians 
xvii
 Sassen writes that it is this tension that gives to immigration its heuristic capacity to illuminate tensions 
at the heart of the historically constructed nation-state. 
